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A Breach Too Far: The Assault on Judges'
Professionalism by the Office of Hearings and Appeals
Honorable Edd Wheeler'
In a book about wartime Holland, a flawed campaign by inept planners
plays its course.' The mistakes of leadership result in failure and in resentment by
professionals toward those responsible. The actions of some leaders in the
adjudicatory arm of the Social Security Administration suggest that ineptitude can
still affect professionals and professionalism.
The following will show that the Office of Hearings and Appeals has
abused the complaint process against judges, has attempted to enforce wrongheaded
sign-in-and-out policies, and has struck at the fabric of professionalism by launching
a project which in large part would replace administrative law judges with agency-
appointed adjudication officers. An unspoken objective of this project is to pay
down the backlog of a half-million disability cases. Some of these actions are merely
unseemly. Others erode organizational infrastructure. The proposed Adjudication
Officer program may prove to be a time-wise but billions-foolish effort which
undercuts the solvency of the Social Security trust funds. In any event,
professionalism is being breached, and in some cases it has been a breach too far.
Before describing what I see as an assault on the professionalism of
administrative law judges in the Office of Hearings and Appeals, it might be helpful
to define professionalism. I elsewhere have offered that: "Professionalism is the
coalescence of knowledge, technical skill, commitment to client, and dedication to
the law and the public good, all in furtherance of providing salutary services for
*Federal Administrative Law Judge for the Office of Hearings and Appeals
(Atlanta), Social Security Administration. Judge Wheeler wrote this article in his private
capacity. The views here do not represent the official position of any part of the U.S.
Government.
'See Cornelius Ryan, A Bridge Too Far (1974).
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those who require them."2 This definition has obvious limitations in its application
to judges, yet it makes clear that professionalism partakes of expertise but goes
beyond expertise.
Shrewd practitioners of law may or may not hit the mark of
professionalism. For example, the defense team for Orenthal J. Simpson was
praised in some quarters for its flashiness and seeming command of the courtroom.
Some might argue that Simpson's lawyers proved their mettle as consummate
professionals. Others would pass on any lionization of lawyers perceived as
polecats.
But if professionalism cannot be defined with precision, neither is it wholly
situational. It can be addressed in descriptive language and this in fact is done in
model codes of conduct. These codes typically speak not only to standards of
behavior but to the ideals and first principles of the profession. The first imperative,
for example, stated at Canon I of the Model Code adopted in 1995 by the National
Conference of Administrative Law Judges is recognizable as a central tenet in
similar judicial codes: "An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to
justice in our society."3 It is axiomatic that professionals are to be independent and
trustworthy. They are expected to embody a higher standard of integrity r.d fair
dealing than is required in the ordinary transactions of life.4 In preparation for the
rigors of service, professionals are to gain "an intellectual technique acquired by
special training."' Professionalism climbs, and takes with it the practitioner, by
'Report of the Committee on Professionalism, Ga. State Bar J., August 1986, at
15. 3A Model Code of Judicial Conduct for State Administrative Law Judges, 15
Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges (JNAALJ) 251, 253
(1995). By announcement, one of the documents upon which this code was based was the
1989 Model Code of Judicial Conduct for Federal Administrative Law Judges.
4A. Carr-Saunders & P. Wilson, Professions, 12 Encyclopedia of the Social
Sciences 479 (1933).
' Id. at 476.
formal and measured step.
There is nothing magical or obscure in all of this. Judges are expected to
act like judges, avoiding not only impropriety but the suggestion of impropriety.
They are expected to be competent and honorable. Judges are not to trifle with the
hallmarks of our system of law and experience. Nor are judges, even administrative
law judges, to be trifled with. The latter is important not for reasons of station or
imperiousness but because of the need to maintain independence and civility in the
chief business of the judge, which is, as Francis Bacon reminded, "to interpret law,
and not to make law, or give law."" It was also Bacon who pointed to the mainstay
of judicial professionalism: "Above all things, integrity is their portion and proper
virtue."7 It might be inappropriate, for instance, to assume that a judge was Absent
Without Leave (AWOL) if he was visiting the urinal. This is not a situation which
likely would have occurred to Bacon. Unfortunately, the example is lifted not from
the theater of the absurd but from recent experience.
Although it is a setting to be desired, professionalism cannot always be
pursued within a decorous venue. Human relations are not immune from
highhandedness or misunderstandings. Professionalism is not only to be enjoyed.
Scmetimes it may be contested and occasionally it must be asserted. The trick of
course is to assert without self-righteousness or undue contentiousness.
Professionalism is to be served by actions rather than by mere words. The following
discussion assumes importance only if it proves to deal with events that are more
than atypical
OF COMPLAINT AND SOLCITATION
In a waiting room of 1 0-by-20 feet, claimants and representatives await
disability hearings in Atlanta. On the bulletin board is an 8 1/2-by-I 1-inch notice
on bright yellow paper. Three lines of bold black print advertise it as an
'Bacon's Essays 138 (F.G. Selby, ed. 1964).7Id.
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IMPORTANT NOTICE TO SOCIAL SECURITY CLAIMANTS. The message
in part reads:
If you think you have been treated unfairly in
a Social Security hearing, you should tell us
about it and ask us to look into it. You can
ask at any time, even while we are deciding
your claim for benefits. For more
information, ask for a copy of the fact sheet,
How To File An Unfair Treatment Complaint
(Publication No. 05-10071)."
The Atlanta office is not unique. The Administration has directed that the
same notice be displayed prominently throughout the Office of Hearings and
Appeals. Claimants of course must have a fair hearing and they should perceive
fairness. Most of them are represented by counsel who assumedly know the
meaning of due process.
Whatever the intent of the notice, it points at least to the possibility that
claimants may be treated unfairly in the hearing. This is a remarkable document, or
advertisement, to be displayed within the venue of a judicial proceeding. It would
be interesting to know if the notice has registered more fully for parties denied
benefits than for those receiving them. In any event, the notice is an affront to the
professionalism of the judge responsible for insuring fairness in the hearing.
However, one of the more egregious incidents spawned by the present
complaint process was a case in which benefits were awarded.
The claimant in question equivocated at the first hearing about whether she
wanted an attorney. The hearing was canceled and the claimant was told
unambiguously that it would be rescheduled and that she was either to obtain
counsel or be ready to proceed at the second hearing without equivocation. All of
this occurred on the record and was recorded on tape. The claimant obtained
counsel and was awarded disability benefits after the rescheduled hearing. She
8Social Security Administration, SSA Publication No. 05-10602, Feb. 1993.
apparently afterward experienced pause about the attorney's payment. She
ostensibly alleged that counsel had been forced upon her and that the judge, among
other transgressions, told her that she must have counsel and that she would be
arrested if she tried to represent herself. She was said to want the attorney's fee
returned to her. The ostensible complainant refused to sign a complaint because she
was said to fear that she might be required to appear again before the judge.
District personnel passed along the "complaint" to the regional chief
administrative law judge with an acknowledgment: "All of our instructions indicate
we need a signed complaint to send the case to the next level."9 The taped recording
of the first hearing was not consulted. Instead, the regional judge processed the
matter as a bona fide complaint. I rejected the allegations as false and scurrilous.
I have received no further information on these reputed charges. My request for the
SSA Inspector General to investigate the matter yielded nothing.
One might interpret the entire episode as an unfortunate administrative
miscue. Or it might be interpreted in terms of power and professionalism. The
latter frankly seems the more plausible interpretation We deal in present events, of
course, not so much with power as pretensions to power. The instinct of the
bureaucrat without answers is to make others answerable. Is it easier to try to call
on the carpet a professional reputedly accused or to listen to a five-minute tape? The
answer depends on whether there are other agendas involved.
The allegations actually did not rise to the level of a complaint because,
of signal importance, the claimant refused to sign the allegations. Nonetheless, the
matter was processed as a bona fide complaint. Of course, pursuant to common law,
pleadings in writing, to include complaints signed by plaintiff or counsel, have been
required for almost 500 years.10
Social Security Administration, Region IV Memorandum on OHA Irregularities,
Feb. 22, 1995.
'°See W. Craies, Pleading, 21 Encyclopedia Britannica 832 (1911).
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However, even where personal agenda might dominate, it is unacceptable
when complaints against judges are solicited. Such fishing expeditions are not
conducive to the maintenance of professionalism. The complete angler is hardly an
appellation to be sought within a judicial setting by an honorable professional.
TIME: PAST, PRESENT AND MISSPENT
Although malice plays some part in human conduct, OHA's frequent
indifference to professionalism seems traceable chiefly to miscalculation and
mismanagement. It is unnecessary here to attempt a detailed analysis of these
reasons. Suffice it to say that attacks on professionalism appear to be anything but
novel occurrences. In 1970, the director of what was then the Bureau of Hearings
and Appeals allegedly was removed for refusing to appoint a certain person as
hearing examiner." The candidate came with political references but the bureau
director judged him to be unqualified. 2 The next 15 years, among other things,
witnessed judges defending their decisional independence when production goals
and then quotas were set under the guise of standards and the enhancement of
efficiency. 13
Nevertheless, the recent policy which preoccupies judges with demands
that some of them sign in and out is unseemly. The time and energy expended on
this sideshow are misspent. The Administration is sorely taxed by a ponderous
backlog of cases. There exists a significant threat of future insolvency in the Social
Security trust funds. Yet judges are distracted by those who would hold them
answerable to the whittle of a time clock. Some would call this butt-in-the-seat
"The title of hearing examiner was changed to that of administrative law judge
in 1972. Prior to 1959, the title had been that of referee. A key reason for changing the
title to judge was to adorn and protect the position with the mantle of professionalism.
'
2See T. Capshaw & C. Robinson, A Quest For Quality, Speedy Justice 15
(1991).
13See Charles N.. Bono, "The Evolution and Role of the Administrative Law
Judge at the Office of Hearings and Appeals in the Social Security Administration," 15
J.N.A.A.L.J. 213,224-235 (1995).
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bureaucracy at its worst.
This selectively enforced policy cannot be analogized to the contest for
billable hours in law firms. The tribunal is not a partners' meeting. Judges
assumnedly are not junior associates. In one surreal case, later remedied, a judge who
visited the urinal upon arrival in the office was initially reported as AWOL. Such
treatment is a gross breach of professionalism. It is erosive of the good order of the
workplace to say nothing of the dignity of the professionals involved.
Administrative law judges are conventionally, and legally, considered to
be salaried employees as opposed to hourly-wage employees. Judges, therefore, are
exempt from Fair Labor Standards Act requirements which govern areas such as
overtime pay and compensatory time-off. But in docking judges' pay for alleged
AWOL and alleged fractions of hours not at work, OHA manifestly has treated the
judges as hourly-wage employees. The abuse registers not only in terms of equity
but in terms of the Fair Labor Standards Act as well. Arguably, OHA stands to lose
its exemption for judges, meaning that the agency could be held responsible for
paying judges on the basis of hours worked including overtime. This outcome
almost certainly was not the purpose of OHA's ill-conceived effort to coerce some
judges into signing in and out, but such a result seems quite possible. For example,
one labor case paints broadly, but within boiders uncomfortable for OHA, that:
Payment on salary basis is thought to identify
executive, administrative, and professional
personnel precisely because it indicates
employees who are given discretion in
managing their time and their activities and
who are not answerable merely for the
number of hours worked or number of tasks
accomplished. Employees paid under a
system that subjects them, even theoretically,
to docking for absences by the hour lack one
of the characteristics explicitly identified ...
A Breach Too Far. The Assault on JudEes
XVI Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 29
[for] salaried pay. 4
The breaches by OHA were actual not theoretical. They were repeated despite
judges' protests grounded on fact, equity, and professionalism. Thus, the agency
may be invited to ride the whirlwind of its choosing.
WHY ADJUDICATE AT ALL?
The agency has a problem. It is a massive problem and OHA must be
credited for searching for dramatic solutions. The agency faces an unprecedented
backlog of a half-million requests for disability hearings. In the 1994 fiscal year,
OHA received 70 percent more hearing requests than received just four years
prior. 5 Many judges, however, doubt that the solutions presently sought are the
correct ones.
The Social Security Administration in 1995 implemented a controversial
project to help reduce the backlog. SSA appears to be attempting to pay down the
backlog. Its Short-Term Disability Project and an intended addition, the
Adjudication Officer program, are structured to enable SSA personnel, other than
judges, to issue favorable rulings on disability claims. SSA is using attorneys and
analysts on "a temporary basis" to pay benefits. 6 It plans to pay an additional
100,000 cases over two years. 7 Use of non-judges will continue with the follow-on
Adjudication Officers, a permanent cadre of paralegal specialists who with staff will
number in the thousands.
But these SSA initiatives seem to be in conflict with the position
description of OHA judges, which in pertinent passages states:
[I]n conformity with the Administrative Procedure Act ... the
administrative law judge has full responsibility and authority to
"'Kinney v. District of Columbia, 994 F. 2d 6, 11 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (footnote
omitted).
"Social Security Administration: 20 CFR Parts 404 and 416, 60 Federal
Register Proposed Rules 19008 (April 14, 1995).
'6Id. at 19009.
"Charles Bono, "Evolution and Role," supra note 13, at 245.
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hold hearings and issue decisions ... and (1) dismiss or allow
requests for hearings and rule on requests for extensions; (2)
identify problems and issues to be solved; (3) analyze all
previously developed evidence and appraise ... adjudicative
processes by the administrative agency; ... (18) fully consider all
the evidence of record and issue decisions within the
requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, which
decisions are completely independent and final, signed only by
him, and published to parties in interest without prior review;..... 8
Common sense indicates that the agency is transferring significant
adjudicatory and firnctional authority from OHA judges to agency appointees. The
professional credentials and independence, and perhaps the legal standing as well,
of the appointees in the pay-down brigade are not established. The professional in
adjudication has been told to stand down. The surrogate, trained by parts but without
the professional gravity of the judge, is appointed to stand in. Many OHA judges
view these initiatives as a rupture of the Administrative Procedure Act and as a
frontal attack on the rationale for judges under our system of administrative justice.
I believe that the objections are justified and that they amount to something far more
than professional pique.
The issue is not merely one of turf, and it would be a profound error to
trivialize it as suck Bailiwicks come and go. Job descriptions can be revised. The
Administrative Procedure Act itself can be revised, although of key importance in
the above context that has not occurred. The essence of the problem, though,
reduces to the question, Why adjudicate at all? I submit that the reason is not to
distribute benefits but to distribute justice. It is fundamental, of course, that
deserving claimants must be identified according to the evidence and paid as soon
as possible. But the central task of the OHA judge is to gather, hear, sift and decide
the case, as opposed simply to paying the claim with all speed. The professional role
of the OHA judge is to determine in a measured but expeditious way whether
SSA/OHA, AL 3 Standard Position Description, Aug. 12, 1994, at 2.
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benefits are warranted. It is not the judge's purpose to expedite payment with one
eye on the clock and the other on the accelerator. A judge is the keeper of evidence,
not the purse. Still, this fact does not mean that decisions should flow without
thought to the solvency of the Social Security trust funds.
I realize that, for claimants in need and personally convinced of the
rightness of their case, talk of professional gravity or distributing justice, as opposed
to money for rent, may sound smug or hollow. Yet not every mention of principle
is Pecksniffian. If the reservoir cracks, the canteen soon becomes irrelevant. Of
concern, for example, there is recei:: evidence that Medicare's Hospital Insurance
Trust Fund is on less sound footing than once thought, losing over $35 million last
year rather than increasing by an anticipated $4.7 billion. 9
Let me return, though, to the question, Why adjudicate at all? There is
another possible response aside from distributing justice. It is a compelling
response: to serve the public interest. But this answer prompts a further question,
How do we serve the public interest? At this point, the polarities of the subject are
exposed. The new OHA Associate Commissioner has stated that there is "no doubt"
that the public interest would be served if the approval rates of the states' disability
adjudication sections were in line with the OHA approval rate, i.e., about 75
percent.2' However, others might contest this proposition. One might well argue
that there is nothing that intrinsically serves the public interest in paying three-
quarters of the millions of disability claims considered by the -tates each year under
the Social Security program. Rather, the objective should be to pay only those
claims which are determined to be deserving of benefits after a conscientious and
professional review of the evidence. This might be termed conservatisrm; it might as
19
"Shortfall Posted By Medicare Fund Two Years Early," New York Times, Feb.
5, 1996, Section A, p.1, col.6.20Remarks by Rita S. Geier during an Atlanta OHA meeting, Sep. 20, 1995 [AL
3 partial transcript].
In Q A
readily be called professionalism or justice.
It is the deserving citizen who suffers most, waiting in a discouragingly
long line, when the backlog of cases becomes unmanageable in large part because
of marginal and occasionally fraudulent claims. The point was well captured last
year by Congressman Jim Bunning:
From 1984 to 1994, the U.S. population grewby 11 percent. In
the same ten years, the number of individuals on Social Security
disability went up 40 percent, to over 5.5 million. Over $42
billion in disability benefits will be paid this year. *** [I]n the
next fifteen years, as much as $275 billion could be redirected
from the retirement fund to the disability fund.
Individuals who work and pay into Social Security must be able
to count on disability benefits to support their families if severe
disability strikes. But benefits should only go to those who are
truly disabled. *** By awarding benefits to borderline cases that
should not be allowed, SSA encourages others who are not truly
disabled to apply in the hope that they, too, will be awarded
benefits.2
OHA is gearing to accelerate the distribution of disability benefits to
claimants. But nothing compelling predicts that this approach will moderate the
increased rate at which disability claims are being filed. On the contrary, evidence
suggests that present initiatives could even have a multiplier effect. During the past
15 years, the number of hearing requests received annually has almost doubled.
During the same period, the OHA pay rate for disability cases increased from 56
percent to 75 percent, and the monthly case productivity ofjudges rose by more than
one-third.22 The increased and more efficient distribution of disability benefits
2
'Quoted in 17 National Organization of Social Security Claimants &
Representatives Social Security Forum 1 (May 1995).
2In the mid-1970s, the reversal or pay rate for disability claims in Hearings &
Appeals was about 42 percent (156,000 cases were received in 1975). By the early
1980s, the pay rate was about 56 percent (over 270,000 case received in 1981). The cost
of the disability program in 1981 was $17 billion, of which $2 billion, according to a
GAO study, was said to be paid to ineligible persons. See T. Capshaw & C. Robinson,
a _;_ 1004
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appears to increase the public appetite for those benefits.
CONCLUSION
It is not my intent to drop a single glove of unproven material by the thorn
bush and then exit, but I believe that an initiative different from those presently on
the rail might prove more effective in addressing what threatens to become an
overwhelming backlog. For example, why might not claimants, upon the second
denial of disability benefits at the state level, be asked to pay a $75 filing fee in order
to appeal the decision and to request a hearing before an administrative law judge?
A nominal payment toward costs and a test of seriousness. The fee, of course, would
be returned, with interest, if the claimant is found to be disabled.
I will not attempt here a detailed defense of the above recommendation, but
I must say that I am mindful that $75 or a similar amount is far from pocket change
for many and perhaps most claimants. Those entering a suitable declaration of
pauperism could be excused the fee requirement. Attorneys would be strictly barred
from underwriting the fee. I believe that such an approach has potential value
because it gives at least some attention to winnowing claims for those that might be
marginal. The proposed fee does not seem unduly onerous when one considers the
magnitude of the present problem in OHA and likely futures. The program would
be monitored closely by judges to protect the rights of claimants and to guard against
abuse of process.
It is telling that during times which test all, when judges' professionalism
might be tapped as an important resource, OHA attempts to circumvent the authority
ofjudges. It is telling also that, at a juncture where judges could be encouraged to
cultivate and strengthen professionalism, the agency seeks to attack professionalism.
This siege must end and conciliation ensue. Absent the latter, the motto of Verdun
supra note 12, at 23-26. In fiscal year 1994, OHA handled "almost 540,000 hearing
receipts and most of these were related to ... disability benefits." See Federal Register,
supra note 15, at 19009 (which noted a record increase in ALU productivity in FY 1994).
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comes to mind: "They shall not pass."
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